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NOTES
SESSION LAWS
All Public and Private Session Laws up to 1850.
NORTH CAROLINA PERIODICALS
The Man of Business-Benjamin Swain, New Salem, 1833-35,
2 vols.
North Carolina Law 1ournal, edited by Paul Jones, Tarboro
(organ of State Bar Association, 1900-1902). Vol. I, Nos.
1, 8, and 12, and Vol. II, Nos. 7, 11, and 12.
While these are not often used by the Law faculty and students
in their daily work, there are occasional calls for them from research
students and it is anticipated that these requests will grow more
frequent as the research work grows in the University.
Most of these rare books, already long out of print, are to be
found in lawyer's offices. For that reason an appeal is made here
to the readers of the NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW, some of whom
very likely own a few of these old volumes, to give or deposit them in
the Law Library. It would be a priceless contribution to the col-
lection and a great service to those students who are concerned with
the historical side of the law.
The Law Library is now prepared to take excellent care of valu-
able books. It is situated in a fireproof building and equipped with
a locked steel cabinet where old books can be stored all the time they
are not in use. It is earnestly hoped that if there are lawyers who
have any of this material, they will be willing to place it in the Law
Library where it will give the maximum service.
LUcILE ELLIOTT,
Chapel Hill, N. C. Law Librarian.
NOTES
THE PRESUMPTION OF AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE FROM PROOF OF
POSSESSION OF LIQUOR: IS POSSESSION FOR HOME CON-
SUMPTION AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE?
The following actual scene is typical of many similar ones en-
acted daily in court-houses throughout the country. A liquor case
is called for trial. The defendant is charged with "unlawful poss-
ession." He pleads not guilty and puts himself on the country. The
state calls a deputy sheriff who testifies that he descended upon the
defendant's home with a search-warrant, and on entering found the
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defendant had fled, leaving behind him broken jugs and jars, and the
remains of a large quantity of liquor which had just been poured out
on the hearth. The state rests and the defendant offers no evidence.
It not being legally allowable to leave the matter to the jury's
unaided common sense, the trial judge is faced with the problem:
How shall he charge the jury? The answer is, surprisingly, not free
from difficulty.
The Volstead Act and the North Carolina Conformity Act
(which is fairly representative of other state enforcements acts)
provide, in substance: (1) that it is unlawful to "possess" liquor,
"except as authorized" in other provisions of the Act ;1 (2) that the
possession of liquor by any person not legally permitted under the
Act to possess liquor is prima facie evidence that such liquor is being
kept for the purpose of being sold or otherwise unlawfully disposed
of;2 (3) "but it shall not be unlawful to possess liquor in one's
private dwelling only, while the same is occupied and used by him as
his dwelling only, provided such liquor is for use only for the per-
sonal consumption of the owner thereof and his family residing in
such dwelling, and of his bona fide guests when entertained by him
therein. ' 3 The Federal Act adds, but the North Carolina Statute
omits: (4) "the burden of proof shall be upon the possessor in any
action concerning the same to prove that such liquor was lawfully
acquired, possessed, and used."'4
'U. S. C. A., Title 27, §12, in part: "No person shall manufacture, sell,
barter, transport, import, export, deliver, furnish or possess any intoxicating
liquor except as authorized in this chapter, and all the provisions of this
chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating
liquor as a beverage may be prevented."
N. C. Public Laws of 1923, ch. 1, §1; N. C. Code 1927, §3411 (b),
in part: "No person shall manufacture, sell, barter, transport, import, export,
deliver, furnish, purchase, or possess any intoxicating liquor except as author-
ized in this article; and all the provisions of this article shall be liberally
construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as beverage may be
prevented."
'The following language from North Carolina Public Laws of 1923, ch.
1, §10 [N. C. Code 1927, §3411 (j)] is copied from the Volstead Act
(U. S. C. A. Title 27, §50): "The possession of liquor by any person not
legally permitted under this article to possess liquor shall be prima facie evi-
dence that such liquor is kept for the purpose of being sold, bartered, ex-
changed, given away, furnished, or otherwise disposed of in violation of the
provisions of this article."
'N. C. Public Laws of 1923, ch. 1, §10 [N. C. Code 1927, §3411 (1)];
U. S. C. A. Title 27, §50.
"U. S. C. A. Title 27, §50.
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In the actual case alluded to5 the judge's solution was to charge
as follows:
"The court instructs you that the burden of proof is upon the state
to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the liquor in
his possession, either actual or constructive, and the court further
instructs you that if he did have it in his poksession that it would be
unlawful, unless he had it in his home for his own use, for his own
personal use or the use of his bona fide friends or guests. The
possession of liquor anywhere in the home or out of the home is
prima facie evidence that he is keeping it for the purpose of vio-
lating the law. It is prima facie evidence that he is keeping it in
violation of the law, and what is meant by that is, that it is artificial
evidence created by the law from certain facts and sufficient to carry
the case to the jury, and upon which the jury may act either way.
. . . The court instructs you that if he had this liquor in his home
for the purpose of selling it, or for the purpose of giving it away,
except as mentioned in the statute, or for the purpose of furnishing
it to somebody else, except as mentioned in the statute, he would be
guilty, but if he had it in his home for his own bona fide use, his
personal use or the use of his bona fide guests, then he would not
be guilty (and the court instructs you as to whether or not he had it
for that purpose is a matter that is 'within his own knowledge alone
and, therefore, the burden is upon him to show that he had it for his
own consumption or for the use of his bona fide guests)."
Was he right in thus placing upon the defendant the "burden of
proof," which it would seem he must have used in the sense of
"burden of persuasion" ?6
Certainly his charge cannot be justified on the ground that the
statutory "permissive presumption" or "prima facie case" which
arose in the state's favor upon the proof of possession, shifted the
burden of persuasion. The locally accepted and generally prevailing
view is that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof in this
sense to the adversary, but only places on him the risk of losing his
case if he does not produce some substantial evidence in rebuttal.7
Nevertheless the change was approved, and it would seem prop-
erly, by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, on another theory.
The court held that there was no need to resort to any shifting, but
that from the outset the burden on this issue was upon the defendant.
'State v. Dowell, 195 N. C. 523, 143 S. E. 133 (1928).
The writer has discussed the different uses of the term "burden of proof"
in an article entitled "Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof," 5
N. C. LAw REvimV 291 (May, 1927).
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In other words, while a formal allegation that the possession was
for purposes of sale (or other specified unlawful disposition) might
be required in the indictment, yet if the defendant is to rely on his
lawful intent to use the liquor for home consumption, he must adduce
proof thereof as an affirmative defense.
At first blush, the holding might be thought to be in conflict with
the earlier decision of the same court in State v. Wilkerson.8 In
that case, under an earlier statute which made proof of possession
of more than one gallon of liquor prima facie evidence of intent to
sell in violation of the act, the trial judge charged the jury that if
possession had been proved to them beyond a reasonable doubt, the
defendant had "the duty of going forward and satisfying the jury
by the greater weight of evidence" that he did not have it for pur-
pose of sale, and this was held to be reversible error, as erroneously
"shifting the burden." The case is readily distinguishable from the
present situation, however, in that the earlier statute9 specifically
defined the crime as "possession, for the purpose of sale" as con-
trasted with the present act which forbids possession generally, sub-
ject to separate exceptions.10 The earlier act moreover, unlike the
present, contained no independent proviso as to "home consumption."
It was, therefore, reasonably construed as making proof of intent
to sell a part of the state's case from the outset, as to which the
burden of persuasion would never shift but would remain to the
end of the trial upon the state.
It is believed that the holding in State v. Dowell, the recent case
referred to, that possession "for home consumption" is an affirmative
defense is justified both upon reason, and upon the authorities cited in
the notes."1 The statute forbidding possession in general terms, sub-
Wigmore, EvIENcE, 2d ed., §§2489, 2490; Kay v. Metropolitan St. R.
Co., 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751 (1900) ; Hunt v. Eure, 189 N. C. 482, 127
S. E. 593 (1925) and other cases cited 5 N. C. LAW Rrmvw 307, note 42.
8164 N. C. 432, 79 S. E. 888 (1913). A like holding was made in State
v. Bean, 175 N. C. 748, 94 S. E. 705 (1917).
'N. C. Public Laws of 1913, ch. 44.
"0 See Note 1, supra.
IExamples of the numerous decisions recognizing affirmative defences in
liquor cases: Dillon v. U. S. (C. C. A., 2d), 279 Fed. 639 (1921) (possession
for home consumption); State v. Yokum, 155 La. 846, 99 So. 621 (1923)
(home consumption); State v. Prophet, 157 La. 550, 102 So. 666 (1925)
(home consumption); People v. De Geovanni, 326 Ill. 230, 157 N. E. 195(1927) (permit); Hiller v. State, 189 Wis. 539, 208 N. W. 260 (1926) (per-
mit); Giacalone v. U. S. (C. C. A., 9th) 13 F. (2) 108 (1926) (registry of
still); Sanford v. State, 198 Ind. 198, 152 N. E. 814 (1926) (registry of still) ;
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ject to exceptions, separately recited, followed by the proviso in a
later section beginning "but it shall not be unlawful" to possess for
home use, thus withdrawing from the statute's operation conduct
which would otherwise be within it, seems to manifest the legislative
intention to make "home consumption" a matter of defense.12 More-
over, this construction seems consonant with wise policy. To impose
upon the defendant the necessity of producing convincing evidence
that his purpose in storing the liquor in his home was to provide for
its use by himself, his family, and his guests, which is ordinarily
readily proveable, seems to impose no undue hardship or risk upon an
innocent man.-3 On the other hand, trials would be prolonged and an
unduly difficult task would be placed upon the state if it must secure
proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," which to the jury often means
direct rather than inferential proof, of a purpose to sell. To place
upon the state the risk of a failure of proof of the unlawful intent
of a proved possessor of liquor, would certainly promote the escape
of the guilty. "When the guilty escape, the judge is condemned."
Davis. v. State (Ark.), 298 S. W. 359 (1927) (registry of still) ; Murray v.
State, 198 Ind. 389, 153 N. E. 773 (1926) (lawful right to transport) ; State
v. Cox, 117 Ore. 204, 243 Pac. 77 (1926) (state must allege non-registration
of still, but defendant must prove registration) ; State v. Barksdale, 181 N. C.
621, 107 S. E. 505 (1921) (prosecution under N. C. Code of 1927, Art. 3373,
for soliciting orders for liquor; defence, that the article sold was a flavoring
extract permitted under N. C. Code of 1927, Art. 3375; the court said: "This,
in our opinion, being the correct construction of the statute, when the State
has offered evidence sufficient to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant is selling, or offering for sale, a liquor or mixture thereof,
containing 40 to 45 per cent alcohol, or which is making men drunk, the de-
fendant should be convicted unless he satisfies the jury, not beyond a reason-
able doubt, but satisfies them that -what he sells, or is offering for sale, comes
within the exception claimed by him, and it must be an extract approved by
valid official sanction or recognized as such by the general trade. The burden
is on him to so prove to the jury that the article he sells is in fact and in
truth what it professed to be, a flavoring extract, and that he is offering it
to be used or sold as such for flavoring purposes and not as a beverage."
Cases of similar purport are collected in BLAKEMORE, PROHMITION (1925),
637, 638.
"State v. Connor, 142 N. C. 700, 55 S. E. 787 (1906); 2 Chamberlayne,
MODERN LAW OF EviE~cE, §960; see also the cases cited under Note 11, supra.
"Compare Singleton v. U. S. (C. C. A. 4th), 290 Fed. 130, 133 (1923)
where the late Circuit Judge Rose said: "One who has become legally
possessed of intoxicants may keep them in his dwelling. He may obtain a
permit for them, but he is not required to do so; but, if the rightfulness of his
having them is legally challenged, the burden is on him to show that he law-
fully obtained, keeps, and uses them. There is nothing harsh or oppressive in
such construction. He always knows how he procured the liquor, and fre-
quently no one else does."
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It may be admitted that it is somewhat incongruous for the legis-
lature to adopt the drastic device of confining the state's case to
"possession," and requiring the defendant to raise and maintain any
issue based on lawfulness of the possession, and yet at the same time
lay down the far milder rule that possession is "prima facie" evi-
dence of guilty purpose, which under accepted usage would seem to
leave it open to the jury to find innocent purpose, though the de-
fendant does not grasp the laboring oar by offering evidence of
innocent purpose.14 Complaint of such an incongruity, however,
"assumes a greater nicety of precision in the use bf language than,
in view of conditions under which legislative draftsmen are com-
pelled to work can ordinarily be expected from them."'r0 Further-
more, there is ordinarily no inconsistency in submitting the case to
the jury on the evidence of possession, where the defendant has of-
fered no evidence in support of the defense of lawful purpose, for
usually the state's evidence will itself disclose some fact (as that
the possession was in the defendant's home) from which the jury
might infer the lawful purpose. Even here, however, the burden of
persuasion, of satisfying the jury of the lawful purpose should of
course be cast on the defendant. Inconsistency could only arise in
the extreme case where the state's evidence of possession discloses
no circumstance upon which the inference of any excepted lawful
use could be based, and the defendant offers no evidence, and in such
a case, it is submitted that, under the North Carolina practice it
would be proper for the court to instruct the jury, not that possession
is prima facie evidence of guilt, but that the defendant not having
sustained any affirmative defense, it is the jury's duty to find the
defendant guilty, if they believe the evidence.' 6
Another and more serious objection to the instruction of the trial
court placing the burden on the defendant, in State v. Dowell, the
case under comment, is raised by Mr. Justice Brogden in a vigorous
dissenting opinion. He disapproves the charge because it deprives
-the defendant of the "right to rely on the weakness of the state's
case" and of the "benefit of the presumption of innocence." But as
14 Such is the usual construction of the term "prima facie evidence." See
for example, State v. Wilkerson, supra, note 8, and McDaniel v. R. Co., 190
N. C. 474, 130 S. E. 208 (1925).
Rose, Circ. Judge, in Singleton v. U. S., 290 F. .130, 132, alluding to an-
other part of the Act.
"A South Carolina decision is to the contrary, however, State v. Burns,
133 S. C. 238 130 S. E. 641 (1925). Compare State v. Helms, 181 N. C. 567,
181 N. C. 567, 107 S. E. 228 (1921).
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the same judge has recently intimated in another case, 17 the pre-
sumption of innocence is but an alternative expression of the rule
that the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt,18 and
the question arises: what is the state's case? Many authorities hold
that that is the entire question of the guilt of the accused, so that if
an issue arises even upon a so-called affirmative defense, the burden
of convincing the jury beyond a reasonable doubt upon such issue is
-upon the state. In this view, the "affirmative defense" in a criminal
case is radically unlike a defense in a civil action, for in the civil
case if the defendant goes no further than to raise a doubt in th6
jury's mind, he will lose, for he has the burden of eitablishing his
defense by a preponderance of the evidence; whereas in a criminal
case if the defendant raises only a reasonable doubt as to the verity
of his defense, he will win. Under this theory, the defendant has
no burden of proof at all in the sense of burden of persuasion, but
only the burden of producing some evidence sufficient to raise a
doubt.' 9 Clearly under this theory, the trial judge's charge placing
the "burden of proof" on defendant would be wrong, or at least mis-
leading. The above-mentioned theory as to criminal defenses, how-
ever, clearly does not obtain in North Carolina which in company
with a few other states,20 consistently applies to criminal defenses the
same principle which obtains as to civil defenses, that is, that a dis-
proof of the defense is no part of the state's case, but the defendant
to succeed in his defense must "satisfy the jury" of its truth and not
merely raise a doubt in their minds about it.21
Under this well-settled local rule, conceding that the purpose of
home-consumption is an affirmative defense, the placing of the bur-
den of proof thereof upon the defendant seems clearly correct. 22
CHARLES T. McCORMICK.
'State v. Boswell, 194 N. C. 260, 263, 142 S. E. 583 (1927).
"Compare 2 Wigmore, EVIDENCE, 2d ed. §2511.
'People v. Beck, 305 Ill. 593, 137 N. E. 454 (1922) ; Brown v. State, 102
Tex. Crim. 522, 278 S. W. 436 (1926) ; Underhill, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 3d ed.§51, note 22; 6 Wigmore, EVIDENCE, §2512; 2 Chamberlayne, MODERN LAW OF
EVimxNcE, §960; Clark, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d. ed., by Mikell), pp. 634-637.
'See 5 Wigmore, EVmENCE, §2512, note 1; Tucker v. State, 89 Md. 471,
43 Atl. 778 (1899) ; Comm. v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343, 80 Atl. 571 (1908).
'State v. Willis, 63 N. C. 26 (1868) ; State v. Barringer, 114 N. C. 840,
19 S. E. 275 (1894); State v. Barrett, 132 N. C.; 1005, 43 S. E. 232; the
matter is discussed and cases collected in the opinion of Stacy, C. J. in Speas
v. The Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 188 N. C. 524, 528, 125 S. E. 398 (1924).
"The dissenting justice seems in one portion of his opinion to concede the
abstract correctness of the charge if the affirmative defense theory be adopted,
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DEcisioNs oF STATE COURTS AS RULES OF DECISION FOR FEDERAL
COURTS ON CoMMoN LAw QUESTIONS'
In a case governed by the common law of a state should the fed-
eral courts follow the decisions of the highest court of that state
finding the applicable principle of the common law? The United
States Supreme Court has recently answered that question in the
negative in a case in which it found the question involved to be one
of "general law."2  The other half of the usual rule is that the
federal courts will follow state court decisions on matters of "local
law" in cases governed by the common law of the state.8
Congress early enacted a statute making the laws of the several
states rules of decision for the federal courts in trials at common
law, where they apply, save where a federal question is involved.4
The Supreme Court does not consider decisions of the state courts
in common law cases "laws" within the meaning of the act.6 As
suggested, the federal courts feel bound by them on matters they
deem to be questions of "local law" but not on questions of "general
law."6
but suggests that even so it was inappropriate in this particular case since
defendant had actually not relied on any such defense. This objection, how-
ever, would be more forceful if defendant had by his evidence controverted
the evidence that he was in the possession of the liquor. Bird v. State, 257
Pac. 2 (Wyo., 1927). In the instant case, however, it is only the theory that
the State's evidence raised some possibility of doubt as to "home consumption"
that prevents the judge from charging the jury that if they believe the evi-
dence of possession the defendant is guilty. The charge actually given putting
the burden on defendant is much milder, and if the defendant is not entitled
to it, certainly he is not harmed by it.
This note is concerned only with the common law of the states. Sug-
gestive comment is made on the statutory aspect of the problem in a note in
5 Tex. L. Rev. 191.
'Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab
and Transfer Co., 48 Sup. St. 404 (1928). The case involved the validity of a
contract between one cab company incorporated in Tennessee and a railroad
company incorporated in Kentucky whereby for a money consideration the
R. R. Co. granted the cab company the exclusive privileges of going on its
premises and trains and in its depots to solicit business. The Kentucky court
had uniformly held such contracts invalid as monopolistic. The U. S. Supreme
Court held that the question was one of general law and sustained the lower
federal court in relying upon its independent judgment to uphold the contract.
'Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Ry. Co., 175 U. S. 91 (1899).
'28 U. S. C. A., §725 (1926). This statute was first enacted in 1789. As
appears from its terms it does not apply to proceedings in equity, admiralty,
federal criminal courts, or to any case involving federdl questions. Bucher
v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555, 582 (1888).
'R. R. Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14 (1880).
'Cab Co. v. Cab Co., supra, note 2.
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The federal rule is illustrated in numerous cases that only make
it the more questionable. In the well-known case of Swift v. Tyson,
Justice Story declared that a question concerning commercial paper
was one of general law, which the court would determine independ-
ently of state decisions.7 The federal courts have treated as ques-
tions of "general law" the validity of a carrier's stipulation against
negligence,8 the liability of a telegraph company to the addressee
for failure to deliver either an interstate9 or an intrastate' o tele-
gram, the question of priority as between assignees of a debt," the
construction of a policy of fire insurance,' 2 the validity of the fel-
low-servant rule's and the application of same,14 the attractive
nuisance doctrine as illustrated in the turntable cases,15 and the ileg-
ality of certain contracts as against public policy such as a contract
in restraint of marriage. 16 On the other hand, the federal courts
follow the decisions of the state courts settling rules of real prop-
erty17 such as those referring to riparian rights ;18 likewise in ques-
tions relating to title to personalty.19 Whether a lease of land by a
railroad company providing that the lessor would not be liable for
damage to the lessee's property on the premises caused by fire from
16 Peters 1 (1842). The question raised was whether an antecedent debt
constituted value for purposes of making one a holder in due course.8Lake Shore, etc. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101 (1893); R. P. Co. v.
Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (1873).
'Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Burris, 179 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910).
.' Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Wood, 57 Fed. 471 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893).
The court deemed the question of damages for mental anguish one of general
law. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 44 Sup.
Ct. 266, 31 A. L. R 867 (1924).
' Carpenter v. The Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Peters 495 (1842);
Hawkeye Commercial Men's Ass'n. v. Christy, 294 Fed. 208 (C. C. A. 8th,
1923), 40 A. L. R. 46.
" Beutler v. Grand Trunk Ry., 224 U. S. 85 (1912).
"'Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 (1893).
Snare and Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1909).
Sheppy v. Stevens, 177 Fed. 484 (C. C. N. D. N. Y., 1910). This court
said: "In the federal courts the question whether a contract is contrary to
public policy and void is one of general law, and not dependent upon any
local statute or usage, and in determining such question the federal courts will
exercise their own judgment."
" Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153 (1827). This case involved the effect of
devises in a will which provided for a devise over in case of failure of issue.
On the other hand, it has just been held the question of what user the
owner of the fee or his lessee may exercise over the right of way of an inter-
state railroad is one of "general jurisprudence." Midland Valley R. Co. v.
Sutter, 28 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 8th., 1928).
'Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254 (1891).
Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U. S. 266 (1891).
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the lessor's locomotives is against public policy has been termed a
question of local law.20 Common law questions not pertaining to
rules of property have been treated in the large as questions of gen-
eral law in deciding which the federal courts do not feel bound to
follow state court decisions.
The distinction so often drawn between so-called "local" and
"'general law" is not a happy one. Justice Holmes' dissenting opin-
ion in the case which suggested this note indicated the fallacious
basis of the distinction.2 1 True, some state law deals with relations
that are of general interest throughout the nation and likewise other
state law deals with purely local matters. But insofar as the law
of the state itself is concerned as law it is either the local law of
that state or not law at all. There is no such thing as "general law"
in the sense of a general law in all the states over and above the
statutory and common law of a given state. The general principles
of the commercial law, for example, are not the law of a state simply
because their uniform recognition is made desirable by the universal
interest in their subject matter. It remains for the state to adopt
them into its law if it sees fit.
The Supreme Court of the United States has conceded that there
is no common law of the United States existing separate and apart
from the law of the states in the same way that federal statutes do.22
If the highest court of a state has declared what the common law of
that state is upon a given question, where else can the federal courts
properly look for the common law of that state but in the state
court's decisions? So far as that state is concerned the law is set-
tied. That courts legislate is clear enough.23 In cases governed by
the common law of a state should the federal courts recognize and
apply that law or follow a policy of laying down what they would
have it to be or what they think it should be ?24
"Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Ry., supra note 3.
Supra note 2.
"Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U. S. 92 (1901).
Gray, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2nd ed., 1921), p. 121; Cardoza,
TBE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922), p. 115 et seq. And see the dis-
senting opinion of Holmes, J., in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349,
370 (1909). For a famous case involving judicial law-making see Fletcher v.
Rylands, L. 1L, 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
" The federal statute, supra note 4, does not conclude this question because
the federal court in the case suggested is supposedly applying the common law"
of the state just as it would be called on to apply a federal statute to a
situation controlled by the same.
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In the case first above cited25 the law of Kentucky, in which
state the contract in question was made, had been settled by judicial
decision since 1892.26 Under those decisions the contract in question
would have fallen as monopolistic. Thus the public policy of Ken-
tucky was involved, the merits of which do not concern us here.
The federal court chose to find what the law and public policy of
Kentucky ought to be rather than the law of the case. It happened
(due to the work of some lawyer familiar with the federal rule, no
doubt) that one of the contracting parties was a foreign corpora-
tion.2 7 If it had been a local one and the case had arisen in Ken-
tucky the ruling would doubtless have been the reverse of that
actually made. The case leaves Kentucky with two conflicting rules
of decision with reference to the same transaction. It certainly
does not strike one as a case involving the independence of the fed-
eral judiciary versus subservience to the state courts, but rather as
one wherein the federal courts failed in their obligation to apply
state law as they find it. Whatever justification there may be in the
historical background of the law merchant for the federal rule as
applied to commercial paper, that very rule itself fails of application
in a case like the Kentucky one, which involves a question of local
interest only.
J. B. FORDEIAM.
MARSHALING ASSETS IN FAVOR OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR
Where one creditor has a lien on two properties in the hands of
the same debtor, and another creditor has a lien on only one of
them, the latter, in equity, may frequently force the former to pro-
ceed first against the singly charged estate,' provided the rights of
the double lienholder are not prejudiced thereby,2 and provided also
that the two properties so charged are more than sufficient to satisfy
25Cab Co. v. Cab Co., supra note 2.
McConnell v. Pedago, 92 Ky. 465, 18 S. W. 15 (1892) ; Palmer Transfer
Co. v. Anderson, 131 Ky. 217, 115 S. W. 182 (1909).
2' Cab. Co. v. Cab Co., supra note 2. The fortunate cab company was a
Tennessee corporation. One issue in the case was whether there was a genuine
diversity of citizenship since it appeared that the Tennessee cab company had
only recently changed its place of incorporation from Kentucky to Tennessee.
'Pope v. Harris, 94 N. C. 62 (1886) ; Harrington v. Furr, 172 N. C. 610,
90 S. E. 775 (1916) ; Trust Co. v. Godwin, 190 N. C. 512, 130 S. E. 323 (1925).
Leading case: Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Ves. Jr. 382, 32 Reprints 402, 18 E. R. C.
198.
'Jones v. Zollicoffer, 9 N. C. 623, 11 Am. Dec. 795 (1823); Knight v.
Rountree, 99 N. C. 389, 6 S. E. 762 (1888).
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the double lienholder's claim. Otherwise, such a course would be
unnecessary. The reason usually given for this procedure is that it
prevents the paramount creditor by his caprice from exhausting the
estate against which the junior creditor is secured, and prevents the
debtor from getting back either fund free of any incumbrance.8
Where, however, the doubly charged estate has already been pro-
ceeded against before the singly secured creditor has taken any
steps, or where, in a proceeding of the sort first referred to, it seems
best to permit the senior lienholder to go first against the doubly
charged estate, the junior creditor is held to be subrogated to the
senior creditor's interest, to the extent that the latter has exhausted
the singly secured creditor's original resources. 4 Frequently, the
junior creditor proceeds by way of injunction,5 if he has been alert
enough to anticipate the other's tactics. And sometimes the question
is raised in connection with a decree for distribution of the proceeds
of the sale of both properties. 6 While the term "marshaling of
assets" is commonly used with reference to all of the situations here
suggested, it is more characteristic of that first mentioned. There
are a few statutes regulating marshaling, but these seem only declara-
tory of the case law.7
In favor of what types of interest and against what types will a
court of equity invoke marshaling?
A junior creditor may not thus proceed against the government
for taxes due in respect to the two lots.8 Nor can he compel a
senior creditor first to proceed against the homestead,9 unless, except
where one is not permitted to waive the homestead exemption, that
estate has been encumbered by the debtor's consent. These results
'PomERoy, EQuITY JURSPRUDENCE, Student's Edition, §1414; Aldrich v.
Cooper, supra note 1; Pope v. Harris, 94 N. C. 62 (1886); Harrington v.
Rawls, 136 N. C. 65, 48 S. E. 571 (1904).
'Ross v. Duggan, 5 Colo. 85 (1879); Jones v. Zollicoffer, supra, note 2;
Hudkins v. Word, 30 W. Virginia 204, 3 S. E. 600, 8 Am. S. R. 22 (1887).
7 Jones v. Zollicoffer, supra, note 2; Dickson v. Back, 32 Or. 217, 51 P. 727,
732, 733 (1897).
'Gotzian v. Shakman, 89 Wis. 52, 61 N. W. 304, 46 Am. St. Rep. 820
(1894).
'See Ash v. Fitzgerald Cotton Oil Co., 27 Ga. A. 35, 107 S. E. 342 (1921);
Harvison v. Griffin, 32 N. D. 188, 155 N. W. 655 (1915); Kent v. Williams,
114 Cal. 537, 46 P. 462 (1896).
'Husbands v. Paducah, 12 Ky. Op. 201 (1883), holding that taxes are not
debts, and thus not subject to marshaling. But see Darby v. Vinnedge, 53
Ind. A. 525, 100 N. E. 862 (1913).
'Pope v. Harris, supra, note 1; Butler v. Stainback, 87 N. C. 216 (1882);
Harris v. Allen, 104 N. C. 86, 10 S. E. 127 (1889).
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are due to the effect of the countervailing policies involved. And in
Winston v. Biggs,'° the North Carolina court refused to permit a
trustee for the benefit of otherwise unsecured creditors to compel
one of the beneficiaries to proceed first under a prior mortgage upon
part of the property conveyed in the deed of trust, before resorting
to the funds held by the trustee. This was apparently because of
the supposed impropriety of the trustee interfering with an advan-
tage conferred by the direction of the settlor. The result, however,
seems unfair to the other creditors. The doctrine of marshaling
has been criticized as being unfair to the unsecured creditors," by
giving to an already secured creditor an advantage never bargained
for. It would seem that the failure to marshal in this case would be
subject to the same criticism.
One need not, however, be technically a creditor, in order to
invoke marshaling. Before the Married Women's Property Act,
where the husband had died indebted, the English court of equity
frequenty required his creditors, at the request of the widow, to go
first against the other personal estate, and then the land, before
resorting to the widow's personal paraphernalia.' 2 And in Young
v. Trustees of Davidson College,13 the North Carolina court per-
mitted the purchaser of land subject to a charge incident to partition
to institute proceedings to compel the owner of that charge to mar-
shal. The decision, however, went off on the ground that the owner
of the charge had a claim against only the plaintiff's lot.
Under what circumstances may a judgment creditor invoke mar-
shaling? The distinction has been made that a subsequent judgment
creditor who has obtained a specific lien by virtue of an attachment,
execution or otherwise, is not in a position, as is a subsequent con-
tractual lienholder, to object to marshaling as between prior lien-
holders.' 4 This is both because he stands in the position of the
debtor, and because he did not give value, without notice of the other
'117 N. C. 206, 23 S. E. 316 (1895).
"Langdell, C. C., A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARvA LAW
R.viEw 55, at pages 69, 70 (1887).
Snelson v. Corbett and Delves, 3 Atkins 370, 26 English Reports 1013
(1746) ; Tipping v. Tipping, 1 Peere Williams 729, 24 English Reports 589
(1721) ; Tynt v. Tynt, 2 Peere Williams 542, 24 English Reports 853 (1729).
See also Howard v. Menifee, 5 Pike (Ark.) 668 (1842).62 N. C. 261 (1867).
"The Oliva A. Carrigan, 7 Fed. 507 (1881); Kendig v. Landis, 135 Pa.
612, 19 A. 1058 (1890).
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creditor's equity, in reliance on the security offered by the debtor,
as would often be true of the contractual lienholder.
It has been held in Ireland that "a judgment creditor has no spe-
cific lien on the land, but only a general lien over all the estate of
his debtor. A general creditor does not stand in the same right as
a specific incumbrancer, and therefore, in ninety-nine cases out of
one hundred, he cannot have any relief against a mortgagee who
has a specific lien."'15 On the contrary, it has frequently been stated
by American courts and writers that a judgment creditor may invoke
marshaling. These remarks, however, are largely if not uniformly
found in connection with situations where the judgment creditor
had already obtained a specific lien by attachment, execution, or
otherwise. 16 And relief by way of marshaling has usually been
given to one in the postion of a mortgagee, an equitable mortgagee, 17
the holder of a mechanic's' 8 or vendor's lien,19 or other specific
incumbrance. 20
In this connection, the recent Virginia case of Kidwell v. Hem-.
derson2l is of particular interest. There a judgment creditor sought
to compel marshaling, claiming a specific lien both by virtue of the
fact that his judgment was for the unpaid balance of the purchase
price of one of the lots, and because his judgment, by confession, had
been made a lien upon this lot only. The court, however, refused
to accord to his judgment any more or different significance by
way of lien than that incident to any other judgment. He had no
vendor's lien, his position being apparently due to his having financed
the purchase. And the restriction of the judgment as a lien to one
upon the particular lot mentioned was held beyond the power of
the court. While the refusal of the court to permit marshaling in
favor of the judgment creditors was due in part to certain other
'Averall v. Wade, Lloyd and Goold, 252, 262, 10 Cond. Eng. Ch. 498(1835); Re Fox, 5 I. Ch. R. 541, P. C. (1856).
"38 Corpus Juris, Marshaling Assets and Securities, paragraph 19, note 12,
and cases there cited. Compare Burgess v. Hitt, 21 Mo. Appeals, 313 (1886):
"We do not mean to say that the doctrine of marshaling securities is not in
any case applied except in favor of a party who has a lien on a portion of
the fund." See also, Young v. Trustees of Davidson College, mepra, note 13.
'Kidwell v. Henderson, 143 S. E. 336, 340 (Va,, 1928).
'Hamilton v. Schwehr, 34 Md. 107 (1870); but see Coburn v. Stephens,
137 Ind. 683, 36 N. E. 132, 45 Am. St. R. 218 (1894).
" Gordon v. Bell, 50 Ala. 213 (1874).
' Wolfe v. Houston etc. Land Co., 44 Tex. Civ. A. 379, 98 S. W. 1069(1907).
143 S. E. 336 (Va., 1928).
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factors, it seems to rest, so far as this aspect of the case is concerned,
upon the tacit assumption that a mere judgment creditor is not in a
position to invoke marshaling of assets. So long as the process is to
be confined to the relative privileges of specific lienholders, the re-
sult seems sound.
J. W. CREw, JR.
BANKER'S LIENS ON DEPOSITS SUBSEQUENT TO INDEBETEDNESS
The question arises in a recent Virginia case1 as to a bank's right
to set off a depositor's indebtedness to it against his balance on
simple account when the money deposited was of a fiduciary char-
acter, the bank having no notice or knowledge of this fact, and
when the debt had been created before this deposit. These funds
were the proceeds of a note collected by the depositor for the plain-
tiff, another bank, which now seeks to show its equities and defeat
the set-off. Held: Plaintiff bank cannot recover.
There is an absence of decision on this question in North Caro-
lina. The cases in other states are in conflict, the weight of author-
ity, however, being in accord with the principal case.
Where the depositary has knowledge that the money deposited
belonged to a third person,2 or where the circumstances are such as
to compel an inquiry3 as to the relation between the depositor and
the funds deposited, no set-off is allowed, on the equitable principle
that one who knows or should know that certain property belongs
to another cannot deal with it in such manner as to interfere with or
extinguish the other's rights thereto. Where, however, the deposi-
tary has extended credit or has in any other way changed its position
to its detriment in reliance upon the credit of the funds deposited
without notice of another's interest therein it is conceded that the
bank may retain as against the beneficial owner.4 This conclusion
is reached in some jurisdictions on the general grounds that where
Federal Reserve Bank v. State and City Bank, 143 S. E. 697 (Va., 1928).
'Central National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. Ed. 693
(1881) ; Union Stockyards Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 411, 11 Sup. Ct. 118,
26 L. Ed. 693 (1890); U. S. v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 269 U. S. 504, 46.
Sup. Ct. 179, reversing decree in 287 F. 971 (C. C. A. N. Y., 1924).
'Union Stockyard Bank v. Moor et al, 79 F. 705, 25 C. C. A. 150 (1897).
'Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 212, 12 L.
Ed. 409 (1847); Brady v. American National Bank, 120 Okla. 159, 250 Pac.
1006 (1926); South West Nat. Bank v. Evans, 94 Okla. 185, 221 Pac. 53
(1923).
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one of two innocent persons must suffer, the loss should fall upon
the one who permitted the depositor to deal with the funds as his
own. In others it is held that the depositary becomes the holder in due
course for a valuable consideration.'
The character of the indebtedness against which the deposit bal-
ance is set off, has often been an influencing factor. Where it is an
overdraft, it is argued that it was in reliance upon the future deposits
in the general course of the business that the overdraft was allowed
to occur, and was intended to be liquidated as soon as sufficient
funds came into the hands of the bank.
It has been held that an express agreement with the bank that it
may apply deposits to the indebtedness gave the bank rights beyond
those flowing from the ordinary relation, and outside of the bank-
er's lien.5 And the fact that the depositor has consented to the
application of the funds to a particular debt has been held to be an
important factor, although to what extent it influenced the decision
the courts do not say. In McStay Supply Co. v. StoddardG the
court declared, "The bank has a lien upon all funds belonging to
depositor, deposited [italics ours] for any indebtedness owing to it by
the depositor." This statement brings up the question of whether
or not the deposit was made specifically to secure that indebtedness.7
Cases containing such distinguishing features as differences in type
of indebtedness, special agreements for security, consent to appli-
cation, etc., have been cited as authority for one another with a re-
sulting confusion which makes predictability difficult.
But it is in the absence of these factors that most dissension
occurs, and it is to such a case that the following discussion refers.
Various theories are advanced for the result reached in the instant
case. The one most generally accepted, however, is: That the rela-
tion between depositor and depositary is that of creditor and debtor,
the bank receiving full title to the funds deposited while the depositor
becomes merely a creditor of the bank for an equivalent amount of
money, and that a bank has a lien or right of set-off of any debt due
it by the depositor, against funds deposited.8
"' See Note 9.
'Hatch v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 147 N. Y. 184, 41 N. E. 403 (1895). The
inference is that upon the strength of the banker's lien alone the set-off may
not have been allowed.
McStay Supply Co. v. Stoddard, 35 Nev. 284, 132 Pac. 545 (1913).
Smith v. Des Moines Bank, 107 Iowa 624, 78 N. W. 238 (1899).
'Commercial National Bank v. Stockyards Loan Co., 16 F. (2d) 911
(C. C. A. 8th., 1926); Arnold v. Bank, 184 Cal. 632, 194 Pac. 1012, 13 A. L. R.,
p. 322 (1921).
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Another line of decisions rests upon the elementary proposition
that if a trustee uses trust money to pay an antecedent debt to a
creditor who has no notice that the money is subject to trust, the
money becomes free from the trust.9 In some jurisdictions, how-
ever, an antecedent debt was not, prior to the N. I. L., valuable
consideration. Section 259' of the N. I. L. has cured this difficulty.
But it may fairly be argued that a bank's off-set of a deposit which
a fiduciary depositor never intended to be applied to his individual
indebtedness is on a different .footing from a voluntary payment by
the trustee. To hold otherwise would seem tantamount to making
a trustee guilty of a breach of trust when there was no such intention
on his part and no act of his which was in the nature of a breach.
That is, of course, assuming that the deposit itself was not wrongful.
The cases contra' 0 seem to resent reaching a result so inequit-
able and ask the question why should a bank which has extended no
new credit or put itself in no more unfavorable position than before
the deposit was made, be allowed to retain funds in its possession
against the beneficial owner merely because it happened to have
possession and legal title at a time when it might sustain loss on
other debts due it from depositor? And, actually, why should it
receive protection at the expense of another when the original loss
was not occasioned by that other's acts. The other courts answer
"the banker's lien."
The banker's lien originated with the goldsmiths on Lombard
Street when banking was in its infancy and the coins deposited
were to be kept intact. Since then, it has been incorporated into the
law merchant and the common law to apply to modern credit-bank-
ing. Some states do not recognize it." The principle upon which it
seems to have been first sustained is that it is partly upon the faith
of f'oneys and securities coming into possession of the banker in the
'First Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank, 102 Mo. App. 357, 76 S. W. 489
(1903) ; 3 POMEROY, EQUITY Jui. (3rd. ed.) §1048.
9" Negotiable Instruments, Brannan 4th Ed. §25. "Value is any consider-
ation sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing
debt constitutes value... .
" Shotvell v. Sioux Falls Bank, 34 S. D. 109, 147 N. W. 288, L. R. A.
1915A 715 (1914); Brady v. American Nat. Bank, supra note 4; Gibbs v.
Commercial and Say. Bank, 208 N. W. 779 (S. D., 1926); Nat. Bank v.
Insurance Co., supra note 2.
'Appeal of the Liggett Spring and Axle Co. Limited, 111 Pa. St. 291, 2
Atl. 685 (1886). "How a custom of this kind could obtain in the face of a
well established legal principle we cannot conceive, for an elementary con-
dition of a custom is that it be lawful, and without this it is vicious and void."
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future course of general dealings that credit is extended. 12 This
principle has persisted in spite of the modern requirement of specific
security for cash loans.
A loose use of the term banker's lien has resulted in much con-
fusion. In the case of a general deposit as contrasted with a pledge,
it is more accurate to use the term a right of set-off, since the title to
funds deposited is in the bank, and what remains to the depositor
is merely a chose in action. This right of set-off, as has been seen,
does not attach upon special deposits,13 or deposits with notice of
fiduciary character.' 4  Since the depositor retains only a claim
against the bank for an equivalent amount of money to that de-
posited, if the money was of fiduciary character, he holds this claim
in trust for the beneficiary.15 It is against this claim that the right
of set-off is exercised. Courts, however, have continued to say that
the bank has a lien on all funds deposited. 16
The question, therefore, narrows down to the limits beyond which
the so-called banker's lien or set-off should not be extended. It is
submitted that in the case where the bank has not changed its posi-
tion in reliance upon a deposit made by one in a fiduciary relation,
unknown to the bank, the minority view is more consistent with
modem commercial and banking practice, and fairer to all parties
concerned. 17
HARRY ROCKWELL.
"Russell v. Hadduck, 3 Gilman (Ill.), 233 (1846). "The true principle
upon which banker's liens must be sustained is there must be a credit given
upon the credit of the securities either in possession or expectance"; in re
Tallassee Mfg. Co., 64 Ala. 567 (1879); Jones on Liens, 261. "The collecting
bank cannot, however, maintain a lien if it has made no advance and given
no credit on account of paper received and collected."
Smith v. Bank. Supra note 7.
'Jones on Liens, 250; Gibbons v. Hecox, 105 Mich. 509, 63 N. W. 519
(1895).
P erry, TRUSTS, 6th ed., 122; 34 H. L. R. 468, 472.
" McStay v. Stoddard, supra note 6; Steere v. Stockyards Nat. Bank, 266
S. W. 531 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924) ; First Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank, .supra
note 9; Smith v. Bank, supra note 7.
' Coburn v. Carstarphen, 194 N. C. 368, 139 S. E. 596 (1927). "A set-off
is in the nature of a payment or credit when debts are mutual. Set-off exists
in mutual debts independent of the statute of set-off. Its flexible character is
used in equity to prevent injustice." Dameron v. Carpenter, 190 N. C. 595,
130 S. E. 328 (1925). It is a matter of conjecture whether this attitude would
or would not prevail in a case similar to the principal one. The minority view
of the question under discussion seems to be the more consistent with the
principle here advanced by the court. See comment on Carstarphen case in
76 PA. L. Rxv. 314 (1928).
